We use Big M method in solving those LPPs in which atleast one of the constraint is of the typew) ≤ x) ≥ y) = z) <Now choose the answer from the codes given below :a) (w) only b) (w) or (z)b) (x) or (y) d) (z) only.ii) In game theory, the dominance rule for column statesthat every element in the dominating column must be............ the corresponding value of the dominatedcolumn.a) less than or equal tob) less thanc) greater thand) greater than or equal to.http://www.makaut.com

Player 1 chooses a row and Player 2 chooses a column. Which is true for the following game?1 \2 L C RT 4, 4 1, 6 2, 4M 6, 0 6, 4 4, 2B 3, 4 5, 9 2, 2(A) T is strongly dominant(B) M is strongly dominated(C) (M,C) survives iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies(D) (B,C) survives iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies

Consider the following three player game.L R L RT 3,5,3 2,2,3 T 2,3,5 4,2,6M 1,4,2 4,0,0 M 1,4,3 1,2,1D 2,4,1 1,0,8 D 1,1,1 3,2,6A BIf the game is dominance solvable, find the outcome that survives the iterative elimination ofstrongly dominated actions. Write your answer as (X, Y, Z) for the actions of Player 1, 2 and 3. Ifthe game is not dominance solvable, write NO.

In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Choose all of below values of X that make strategy D a strongly dominant strategy for Player 1 in the following game. L R T 2,3 -2,-3 D 3,2 X,-2 -3 -2 0 2 3 4

(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Which is true for the following game according to the solution concept of iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies? A B C D a 4,3 -2,0 2,2 1,6 b 6,-1 4,-1 0,-2 0,-2 c 5,9 2,6 1,7 5,7 Player 1 is guaranteed a payoff of 6. The strategy profiles (b,A) and (b,B) solve the game. The unique strategy profile that solves the game is (c,A). None of the other alternatives is true. The unique strategy profile that solves the game is (b,A). Strategy profiles (a,D) and (b,D) solve the game.

For a a maximization problem the coefficient of the artificial variable in theobjective function of an LPP isa) M b) – Mc) 0 d) none of these.vii) The point of intersection of pure strategies in a game is calleda) value of the game b) Saddle pointc) mixed strategy d) optimal strategy.viii) The value of the game having the following pay-off matrix isB 1 B 2 B 3A 1 10 2 3A 2 7 6 8A 3 0 3 1a) 6 b) 10c) 8 d) 2.ix) The EOQ formula under lot size model without shortage isa) 2C 3C 1 R b) 2 C 3 RC 1c) 2 C 3 RC 1d) 2C 3C 1.x) Given a system of m simultaneous equations in n unknowns ( m < n ) thenumber of basic variables will bea) m b) nc) m – n d) m + n.xi) In an assignment problem involving four workers and three jobs, the totalnumber of assignments possible area) 4 b) 3c) 7 d) 21.