Consider the following three player game.L R L RT 3,5,3 2,2,3 T 2,3,5 4,2,6M 1,4,2 4,0,0 M 1,4,3 1,2,1D 2,4,1 1,0,8 D 1,1,1 3,2,6A BIf the game is dominance solvable, find the outcome that survives the iterative elimination ofstrongly dominated actions. Write your answer as (X, Y, Z) for the actions of Player 1, 2 and 3. Ifthe game is not dominance solvable, write NO.

To solve this game using the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies, we first need to identify if any player has a strategy that is always worse than another strategy, regardless of what the other players do.

Let's start with Player 1. We can see that strategy M strongly dominates strategy D because for every possible action of Player 2, the payoff of M is always higher than D. Therefore, we can eliminate strategy D for Player 1.

Next, let's look at Player 2. After eliminating strategy D for Player 1, we can see that strategy B strongly dominates strategy A for Player 2 because for every possible action of Player 1, the payoff of B is always higher than A. Therefore, we can eliminate strategy A for Player 2.

Finally, let's look at Player 3. After eliminating strategy D for Player 1 and strategy A for Player 2, we can see that strategy R strongly dominates strategy L for Player 3 because for every possible action of Player 1 and Player 2, the payoff of R is always higher than L. Therefore, we can eliminate strategy L for Player 3.

After the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies, we are left with strategy M for Player 1, strategy B for Player 2, and strategy R for Player 3. Therefore, the outcome that survives the iterative elimination of strongly dominated actions is (M, B, R).

To solve this game using the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies, we first need to identify if any player has a strategy that is always worse than another strategy, regardless of what the other players do.

Let's start with Player 1. We can see that strategy M strongly dominates strategy D because for every possible action of Player 2, the payoff for M is always higher than for D. Therefore, we can eliminate strategy D for Player 1.

Next, let's look at Player 2. After eliminating D for Player 1, we can see that strategy B strongly dominates strategy A for Player 2. This is because for every possible action of Player 1, the payoff for B is always higher than for A. Therefore, we can eliminate strategy A for Player 2.

Finally, let's look at Player 3. After eliminating D for Player 1 and A for Player 2, we can see that strategy R strongly dominates strategy L for Player 3. This is because for every possible action of Player 1 and Player 2, the payoff for R is always higher than for L. Therefore, we can eliminate strategy L for Player 3.

After these eliminations, we are left with one strategy for each player: M for Player 1, B for Player 2, and R for Player 3. Therefore, the outcome that survives the iterative elimination of strongly dominated actions is (M, B, R).