For a a maximization problem the coefficient of the artificial variable in theobjective function of an LPP isa) M b) – Mc) 0 d) none of these.vii) The point of intersection of pure strategies in a game is calleda) value of the game b) Saddle pointc) mixed strategy d) optimal strategy.viii) The value of the game having the following pay-off matrix isB 1 B 2 B 3A 1 10 2 3A 2 7 6 8A 3 0 3 1a) 6 b) 10c) 8 d) 2.ix) The EOQ formula under lot size model without shortage isa) 2C 3C 1 R b) 2 C 3 RC 1c) 2 C 3 RC 1d) 2C 3C 1.x) Given a system of m simultaneous equations in n unknowns ( m < n ) thenumber of basic variables will bea) m b) nc) m – n d) m + n.xi) In an assignment problem involving four workers and three jobs, the totalnumber of assignments possible area) 4 b) 3c) 7 d) 21.

We use Big M method in solving those LPPs in which atleast one of the constraint is of the typew) ≤ x) ≥ y) = z) <Now choose the answer from the codes given below :a) (w) only b) (w) or (z)b) (x) or (y) d) (z) only.ii) In game theory, the dominance rule for column statesthat every element in the dominating column must be............ the corresponding value of the dominatedcolumn.a) less than or equal tob) less thanc) greater thand) greater than or equal to.http://www.makaut.com

Firms A and B choose how much of a a homogenous good to produce at a marginal cost of1. The inverse demand function is p = 25 − qA − qB where qA is the output choice of firm A and qBis the output choice of firm B. A firm’s action is its output choice and can be any number greaterthan or equal to zero.Eliminating all strongly dominated actions by the two firms in the first round. In the gamethat remains eliminate all strongly dominated actions in a second round. What is the set of actionsthat are still available to each of the two firms after the second elimination round?[Write your answer as an interval; e.g.: [0.2, 0.4] or (0.3, 0.5], etc.

Consider the two player game described by the payoff matric below. L R U 3,3 2,x D 2,3 1,2 What value must x NOT BE for the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies to lead to a single outcome? Write your answer as an integer (e.g. 5).

A firm has prepared the following binary integer program to evaluate a number of potentialnew capital projects. The firm's goal is to maximize the net present value of their decisionwhile not spending more than their currently available capital.Max 100x1 + 120x2 + 90x3 + 135x4s.t. 150x1 + 200x2 + 225x3 + 175x4 ≤ 500 {Constraint 1}x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 ≥ 2 {Constraint 2}x2 + x4 ≤ 1 {Constraint 3}x2 + x3 ≥ 1 {Constraint 4}x1 = x4 {Constraint 5}Which of the constraints ensures that at least two of the potential projects will be selected?A) Constraint 1B) Constraint 2C) Constraint 3D) Constraint 4E) Constraint 5

In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.)Which is true for the following game according to the solution concept of iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies?  A  B Ca  1,4  -2,-2   4,0b  6,2 -2,3 3,-6c 5,-1 -1,0 5,2d 0,0 0,3 5,4 Player 2 is guaranteed a payoff of 4. None of the other alternatives is true. The strategy profiles (c,C) and (d,C) solve the game. The unique strategy profile that solves the game is (d,C). The unique strategy profile that solves the game is (b,A). Player 1 is guaranteed a payoff of 6.