You and your friend are invited to a picnic and asked to bring either potato salad or fruit salad. You realize that if you both bring the same type of salad, people will be disappointed by not having the other kind available. You and your friend are in a(n):Question 18Answera.Nash equilibrium.b.anti-coordination gamec.collusive agreement.d.coordination game.

Consider two restaurants, R1 and R2, simultaneously decide what sort of cuisine they will focus on, Thai (T) or Vietnamese (V). If both opt for T, the payoffs are 10 each. If both opt for V, the payoffs are 20 each. If R1 plays T and R2 V the payoffs are (30, 40). If R1 plays V and R2 T, the payoffs are (50, 60) for R1 and R2, respectively. What are the Nash equilibria?Group of answer choices(V, V)(T, T)(T, T) and (V, V); this is a coordination game(T, V) and (V, T); this is a coordination game.None of the above.

onsider the following two-player game with three actions for each player. How many Nash equilibria are there? (If you are familiar with the concept of mixed strategies, do not count the mixed equilibria.)1 point12342.Question 2In the coordination game without correct beliefs, which of these can occur? 1 pointBelief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is predictable. Belief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is unpredictable.

Consider the following game represented in normal form. Terry and Kerry are roommates who must make decisions about cleaning. Terry’s payoff is the first number in each cell and a higher number is a better outcome. Assume that Terry makes his decision first, if so what is the Nash Equilibrium of this game:   Kerry  CleanDon’t cleanTerryClean( 8, 2 )( 3, 5 )Don’t clean( 10, 3 )( 4, 1 )Group of answer choicesTerry will clean and Kerry will not clean.Terry will not clean and Kerry will not clean.Terry will not clean and Kerry will clean.Terry will clean and Kerry will clean.More information is required to answer this question.

Question 6Which game has no mixed Nash equilibrium, i.e., no Nash equilibrium where at least one player chooses random behavior? Choose the correct game with a correct reason. 1 pointThe coordination game, because payoffs for each player are the same across two Nash equilibria. The battle of the Sexes, because players have made a promise where to visit during the next holiday. The matching pennies, because the result of a coin-toss trial can be perfectly predicted by today’s science. The prisoner’s dilemma, because defection is best for both players and they do not consider that mutual cooperation can be attained.

Which is true for the following game?1 \2 L C RT 2, 3 3, 4 4, 8M 5, 6 4, 3 7, 1B 6, 2 5, 5 2, 4(A) There is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays both M and B withpositive probability and Player 2 plays both L and C with positive probability(B) The best response of Player 2 to M is C(C) (B,C) is the only Nash equilibrium(D) (M,L) is a Nash equilibrium