onsider the following two-player game with three actions for each player. How many Nash equilibria are there? (If you are familiar with the concept of mixed strategies, do not count the mixed equilibria.)1 point12342.Question 2In the coordination game without correct beliefs, which of these can occur? 1 pointBelief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is predictable. Belief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is unpredictable.

Question 1Consider the following two-player game with three actions for each player. How many Nash equilibria are there? (If you are familiar with the concept of mixed strategies, do not count the mixed equilibria.)1 point1234

Question 2In the coordination game without correct beliefs, which of these can occur? 1 pointBelief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is predictable. Players actually play a Nash equilibrium, and which equilibrium is played is predictable. Players actually play a Nash equilibrium, and which equilibrium is played is unpredictable. Belief disagreement may leads to non-Nash outcomes, and its realization is unpredictable.

Question 5What kind of insights does the Coordination Game provide? Choose all applicable statements.1 pointThere can be many Nash equilibria in a game. The popular computer keyboard design was inherited from typewriters. Players can always coordinate on the optimal outcome. The de facto standard of a new technology may not be efficient.A game might have good and bad Nash equilibria (the former are better than the latter for everyone). There is a unique self-fulfilling prophecy. 6.Question 6Which game has no mixed Nash equilibrium, i.e., no

Consider the following game in which Sally can play T or B and John chooses between L or R. Each player makes their choice simultaneously. If Sally chooses T and John chooses L ,Sally gets a payoff of 3 and John has a payoff of 7. If Sally plays T and John R, Sally’s payoff is 2 and John gets 1. If Sally Chooses B and John L, the payoffs are 1 to Sally and 2 to John. Finally, if Sally chooses B and John R, the payoffs are 4 to Sally and 3 to John. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices(T,R)(B,R)(T,L) and (B,R)(T,L)None of the above

Consider the following game. Player A and B simultaneously choose to work on either Project 1 (P1) or Project 2 (P2). The payoffs are as follows: if both players choose P1 the payoffs are 6 to A and 2 to B; if A chooses P1 and B chooses P2 the payoffs are 0 to each party; likewise, if A chooses P2 and B chooses P1 the payoffs are 0 to each party; and, finally, if A chooses P2 and B P2 the payoffs are 3 to both players. What are all of the Nash equilibria of this game? a. (P1, P1) b. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) c. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 1/3, Player B plays P1 with probability 1/2) d. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 3/5, Player B plays P1 with probability 1/3) e. (P1, P2), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 1/2, Player B plays P1 with probability 2/3)