Consider the following entry game. NW Coffee decides whether to Enter or Not Enter a market. If NW Coffee chooses Not Enter it gets a payoff of -10 and Dunkin’ Donuts (DDs) gets a payoff of 30. If NW Coffee Enters, DDs can choose to either Punish or to Cooperate. If DDs chooses Punish following Enter, the payoffs are -5 to NW Coffee and 25 to DDs. If DDs chooses to Cooperate following Enter, NW Coffee gets a payoff of 20 and DDs gets 20. What are the subgame (credible) equilibria?Group of answer choices(Enter, Cooperate).(Not Enter, Punish)(Enter, Punish)There is no subgame equilibrium.None of the other answers are correct.

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). Each firm simultaneously makes its choice whether or not to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE).  If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices. (NE, E) and (E, NE), where the first strategy in each parentheses is Apple’s and the second is Samsung’s(E, E)(E, NE)(E, E) and (NE, NE)(NE, E)

Consider the following game in which Sally can play T or B and John chooses between L or R. Each player makes their choice simultaneously. If Sally chooses T and John chooses L, Sally gets a payoff of 3 and John has a payoff of 7. If Sally plays T and John R, Sally’s payoff is 5 and John gets 1. If Sally Chooses B and John L, the payoffs are 1 to Sally and 2 to John. Finally, if Sally chooses B and John R, the payoffs are 4 to Sally and 3 to John. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices(T,L) and (B,R)(T,L)(B,R)None of the other answers are correct.(T, R)

Consider two restaurants, R1 and R2, simultaneously decide what sort of cuisine they will focus on, Thai (T) or Vietnamese (V). If both opt for T, the payoffs are 10 each. If both opt for V, the payoffs are 20 each. If R1 plays T and R2 V the payoffs are (30, 40). If R1 plays V and R2 T, the payoffs are (50, 60) for R1 and R2, respectively. What are the Nash equilibria?Group of answer choices(V, V)(T, T)(T, T) and (V, V); this is a coordination game(T, V) and (V, T); this is a coordination game.None of the above.

Consider the following game represented in normal form. Terry and Kerry are roommates who must make decisions about cleaning. Terry’s payoff is the first number in each cell and a higher number is a better outcome. Assume that Terry makes his decision first, if so what is the Nash Equilibrium of this game:   Kerry  CleanDon’t cleanTerryClean( 8, 2 )( 3, 5 )Don’t clean( 10, 3 )( 4, 1 )Group of answer choicesTerry will clean and Kerry will not clean.Terry will not clean and Kerry will not clean.Terry will not clean and Kerry will clean.Terry will clean and Kerry will clean.More information is required to answer this question.

Consider an application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game where two countries in a cartel decide whether to Cooperate or Defect. If both choose to follow the cartel agreement and continues cooperating with each other, each receives a payoff of 2. If both decide to defect on each other, they both get -2. If one cooperates and the other defects, the first one loses 10 (she receives -10) while the other gets 0. Denote the probability of cooperating for Player 1 as p and for Player 2 as q.How much does Player 1 earn in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game?