Knowee
Questions
Features
Study Tools

Consider an application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game where two countries in a cartel decide whether to Cooperate or Defect. If both choose to follow the cartel agreement and continues cooperating with each other, each receives a payoff of 2. If both decide to defect on each other, they both get -2. If one cooperates and the other defects, the first one loses 10 (she receives -10) while the other gets 0. Denote the probability of cooperating for Player 1 as p and for Player 2 as q.How much does Player 1 earn in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game?

Question

Consider an application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game where two countries in a cartel decide whether to Cooperate or Defect. If both choose to follow the cartel agreement and continues cooperating with each other, each receives a payoff of 2. If both decide to defect on each other, they both get -2. If one cooperates and the other defects, the first one loses 10 (she receives -10) while the other gets 0. Denote the probability of cooperating for Player 1 as p and for Player 2 as q.How much does Player 1 earn in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game?

...expand
🧐 Not the exact question you are looking for?Go ask a question

Solution

To find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, we first need to set up the payoff matrix for the game.

Cooperate (q) Defect (1-q)
Cooperate (p) 2,2 -10,0
Defect (1-p) 0,-10 -2,-2

In a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, each player is indifferent between their strategies given the strategy of the other player. This means that the expected payoff from cooperating must equal the expected payoff from defecting for both players.

For Player 1, the expected payoff from cooperating is 2q - 10(1-q) and the expected payoff from defecting is -2q. Setting these equal to each other gives:

2q - 10 + 10q = -2q 12q = 10 q = 10/12 = 5/6

So in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, Player 1 cooperates with probability 5/6.

The expected payoff for Player 1 in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is then the expected payoff from either cooperating or defecting, which are now equal, so we can just calculate one of them:

E[Payoff] = 2(5/6) - 10(1 - 5/6) = 10/3 - 10/3 = 0

So Player 1 earns 0 in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.

This problem has been solved

Similar Questions

Consider the below payoff matrix. Player 1 chooses rows and Player 2 chooses columns.  A BX 15 , 0 0 , 8Y 0 , 39 15 , 0Denote the probability of “X" for Player 1 as p, and the probability of “A” for Player 2 as q. What is the value of q in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game? Round your answer to two decimal places (e.g. 0.15).

Question 6Which game has no mixed Nash equilibrium, i.e., no Nash equilibrium where at least one player chooses random behavior? Choose the correct game with a correct reason. 1 pointThe coordination game, because payoffs for each player are the same across two Nash equilibria. The battle of the Sexes, because players have made a promise where to visit during the next holiday. The matching pennies, because the result of a coin-toss trial can be perfectly predicted by today’s science. The prisoner’s dilemma, because defection is best for both players and they do not consider that mutual cooperation can be attained.

There are two players in the game. Both workers can choose either plan A or plan B. If both choose plan A, they will get 20 individually. Meanwhile, if they both choose B, they will both obtain 20 as well. Whereas, if player 1 decide to choose plan A and player 2 choose plan B, then player 1 can get 50 and player 2 will get 30. However, if player 1 choose plan B and player 2 choose plan A, player 1 will get 30 but player 2 gets 40. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, what is the probability that player 2 choose plan A?

Consider the following scenario in an organization, represented by the game below. Players 1 and 2 choose their actions simultaneously. The first payoff in each square is 1’s payoff; the second is the payoff of player 2. 2 cooperate revenge 1 cooperate 13,15 8,16 revenge 17,3 10,12 Which statement is true, where the first strategy is player 1’s and the second is for player 2?Group of answer choicesThe Nash equilibrium is (Cooperate, Renege); this is a prisoners’ dilemma.The Nash equilibrium is (Renege, Cooperate); this is a prisoners’ dilemma.The Nash equilibrium is (Renege, Renege); this is not a prisoners’ dilemma.The Nash equilibrium is (Renege, Renege); this is a prisoners’ dilemma.The Nash equilibrium is (Cooperate, Cooperate); this is not a prisoners’ dilemma.

Consider the following game represented in normal form. Terry and Kerry are roommates who must make decisions about cleaning. Terry’s payoff is the first number in each cell and a higher number is a better outcome. Assume that Terry makes his decision first, if so what is the Nash Equilibrium of this game:   Kerry  CleanDon’t cleanTerryClean( 8, 2 )( 3, 5 )Don’t clean( 10, 3 )( 4, 1 )Group of answer choicesTerry will clean and Kerry will not clean.Terry will not clean and Kerry will not clean.Terry will not clean and Kerry will clean.Terry will clean and Kerry will clean.More information is required to answer this question.

1/3

Upgrade your grade with Knowee

Get personalized homework help. Review tough concepts in more detail, or go deeper into your topic by exploring other relevant questions.