What is the phenomenological fallacy, according to type-identity theorists?

The phenomenological fallacy, according to type-identity theorists, is the mistake of confusing the properties of the experience of a phenomenon with the properties of the phenomenon itself.

Here's a step-by-step explanation:

1. Type-identity theorists are those who believe that mental states or processes are identical to certain types of physical states or processes. For example, they might argue that the feeling of pain is identical to a certain type of brain state.

2. The phenomenological fallacy is a concept that comes up in discussions about the nature of consciousness and the mind-body problem.

3. The fallacy involves confusing two different types of properties: the properties of the experience of a phenomenon and the properties of the phenomenon itself.

4. For example, consider the experience of seeing the color red. The experience of seeing red has certain properties - it might be vivid, it might be accompanied by certain emotions, etc. But these are properties of the experience, not of the color red itself. The color red, as a physical phenomenon, has its own properties - it reflects light at a certain wavelength, etc.

5. According to type-identity theorists, it's a mistake to attribute the properties of the experience (the vividness, the accompanying emotions) to the physical phenomenon (the color red). This is the phenomenological fallacy.

6. This fallacy can lead to confusion and misunderstanding in discussions about the nature of mind and consciousness. For example, it might lead someone to argue that because their experience of the color red is subjective and personal, the color red itself must also be subjective and personal. But this is a mistake - the color red, as a physical phenomenon, exists independently of anyone's experience of it.