Steph is deciding on whether to Open (O) a flower shop or Not (N) next to Woolworths, who already sell flowers. If Steph chooses to Open, Woolworths then can choose to Fight (F) or Accommodate (A). If Woolworths chooses F, following Stephs choice to Open, the payoff is (-5, 5) to Steph and Woolworths, respectively. If Steph chooses to Open, then Woolworths opts for A payoffs are (10, 15). If Steph opts for N, the payoff to Steph is 0 and Woolworths gets 20. Which of the following is a Nash Equillibrium that is NOT a subgame perfect equillibrium:Group of answer choices(O,F)(O,A)(N,F)(N,A)

Consider the strategic interaction between Coles and Woolworths considering entering and establishing a store in a country town. Coles gets to make its decision first. It can Enter (E) or Not Enter (NE). This choice is observed by Woolworths that then chooses either E or NE. If both firms opt for E they each get -5. If both choose NE, the payoff to each is 5. If Coles opts for E and Woolworths NE Coles gets 20 and Woolworths 0. Conversely, if Coles goes NE and Woolworths E, Woolworths gets 20 and Coles 0.If possible, in this strategic environment, you would prefer to be                because there is a                .Group of answer choicesColes; first-mover advantage.Woolworths; first-mover advantage.Coles; second-mover advantage.Woolworths; second-mover advantage.either Coles or Woolworths; either first-mover or second-mover advantage.

Consider a pricing game between Coles and Woolworths. Each firm simultaneously chooses whether to price High or Low. If both firms price Low, the payoffs are 8 to Coles and 2 to Woolworths. If both firms choose High, the payoffs are 3 to Coles and 7 to Woolworths. If Coles opts for Low and Woolworths High, Coles gets 5 and Woolworths 4. Finally, if Coles plays High and Woolworths Low, Coles gets 7 and Woolworths receives a payoff of 6. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesthe outcome of the game is (Low, High), where Coles if playing the first strategy Low and Woolworths High; this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, Low); this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (Low, Low); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is a prisoners’ dilemmathe outcome of the game is (High, High); this game is not a prisoners’ dilemma

Mary can choose to open her restaurant in Darlinghurst (D) or Newtown (N). Mary’s choice is observed by Jim, who can then choose to set up his establishment in either D or N. If Mary chooses D and then Jim D, the payoffs are (80, 40) to Mary and Jim, respectively. If the actions are (D, N), the payoffs are (40, 50). If the actions taken by the two restauranteurs are N followed by D, the payoffs are (30, 40). Finally, if the actions are (N, N) the payoffs are (50, 80). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibria, what actions do we see being played by Mary and Jim, respectively?Group of answer choicesN and ND and ND and DN and DNone of the other answers are correct

Consider a market in which Aldi must choose whether to Enter (E) or Not Enter (NE). If Aldi chooses to Not Enter, its payoff is 10 and its rival Coles’ payoff is 20. If Aldi Enters this is observed by Coles, and Coles must choose either to Punish (P) or Accommodate (A). If following Entry by Aldi Coles Punishes the payoffs are 5 to Aldi and 10 to Coles. If following Entry by Aldi Coles Accommodates the payoffs are 12 to Aldi and 15 to Coles. What are the credible equilibria (SPE) of the game?

Consider a market in which Aldi must choose whether to Enter (E) or Not Enter (NE). If Aldi chooses to Not Enter, its payoff is 10 and its rival Coles’ payoff is 20. If Aldi Enters this is observed by Coles, and Coles must choose either to Punish (P) or Accommodate (A). If following Entry by Aldi Coles Punishes the payoffs are 5 to Aldi and 10 to Coles. If following Entry by Aldi Coles Accommodates the payoffs are 12 to Aldi and 8 to Coles. What are the credible equilibria (SPE) of the game?