Mary can choose to open her restaurant in Darlinghurst (D) or Newtown (N). Mary’s choice is observed by Jim, who can then choose to set up his establishment in either D or N. If Mary chooses D and then Jim D, the payoffs are (80, 40) to Mary and Jim, respectively. If the actions are (D, N), the payoffs are (40, 50). If the actions taken by the two restauranteurs are N followed by D, the payoffs are (30, 40). Finally, if the actions are (N, N) the payoffs are (50, 80). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibria, what actions do we see being played by Mary and Jim, respectively?Group of answer choicesN and ND and ND and DN and DNone of the other answers are correct

Two restaurant proprietors, James and May, must simultaneously decide on the locations of their restaurants. The choices are on Pitt Street (P) or King Street (K). If both opt for P, the payoffs are (10, 20) to James and May, respectively. If both proprietors opt for K the payoffs are (10, 8). If James choose P and May chooses K, the payoffs are (5, 4). Finally, if James chooses K and May chooses P, the payoffs are (7, 3). The Nash equilibrium/equilibria is/are . This is a game

Consider the location game between two bakeries, Pie Belly and the Lazy Croissant. Pie Belly moves first, chooses to locate either in the Mall or on the Side Alley. Observing this, the Lazy Croissant then chooses its location, which can similarly be in the Mall or on the Side Alley. The payoffs are as follows: if both firms choose Mall the payoffs are (50, 30) to Pie Belly and the Lazy Croissant; if Pie Belly chooses Mall and the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley the payoffs are (40, 40); if Pie Belly chooses the Side Alley and the Lazy Croissant opts for the Mall, the payoffs are (60, 35); and if both firms opt for the Side Alley the payoffs are (30, 20) respectively. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Mall and then the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley; there is a second-mover advantageIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Side Alley and then the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley; there is a second-mover advantageIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Side Alley and then the Lazy Croissant the Side Alley; there is a first-mover advantageIn the credible equilibria, we observe Pie Belly choosing Side Alley and then the Lazy Croissant the Mall; there is a first-mover advantageNone of the above statements are true

Consider the following sequential game. Wally first chooses L or H. Having observed Wally’s choice, Elizabeth chooses between A and F. The payoffs are as follows. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth chose A, the payoffs are 30 to Wally and 20 to Elizabeth. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 40 to Wally and 10 and to Elizabeth. If Wally decides to opt for H and Elizabeth A, the payoffs are 10 and 2 to Wally and Elizabeth, respectively. Finally, if Wally opts for H and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 35 toWally and 5 to Elizabeth. What is the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game?Group of answer choices(L,F)(H,A)(H,F) and (L,F)(L,A) and (H,F)(H,F)

Steph is deciding on whether to Open (O) a flower shop or Not (N) next to Woolworths, who already sell flowers. If Steph chooses to Open, Woolworths then can choose to Fight (F) or Accommodate (A). If Woolworths chooses F, following Stephs choice to Open, the payoff is (-5, 5) to Steph and Woolworths, respectively. If Steph chooses to Open, then Woolworths opts for A payoffs are (10, 15). If Steph opts for N, the payoff to Steph is 0 and Woolworths gets 20. Which of the following is a Nash Equillibrium that is NOT a subgame perfect equillibrium:Group of answer choices(O,F)(O,A)(N,F)(N,A)

Consider two hotel chains, Hotel Max and Living Large, considering what size hotel to build in a new holiday location that has just been opened for development. In terms of timing, Hotel Max first chooses to build either a Big or Small hotel. Living Large observes its rival’s hotel size, then makes its choice. If both build a Big hotel, the payoffs are 3 to each. If they both opt for a Small facility, they each get a payoff of 6. If one chain builds Big and the other Small, the chain that built the Big hotel gets 10 and the chain with the Small hotel gets 5. Which hotel chain would you prefer to be?Group of answer choicesLiving LargeHotel MaxIt does not matter – their profits are the sameThere is not enough information to answer the question.