A normal form game can only have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if it has at least two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Question 1 Select one: True False

If a 2 × 2 (2 players with 2 actions each) normal form (matrix) game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria then: (A) Neither player has a dominant strategy. (B) Exactly one player has a dominant strategy. (C) At least one player has a dominant strategy. (D) Both players have dominant strategies. (E) None of the above is necessarily true

Consider the following abstract two-player game in normal form. Find all pure and mixed-strategy equilibria for this game.HINT: Consider the notion of dominated strategies, in which some strategies are strictly dominated by others, so can be discarded.Show your workingYour Answer:

Which is true for the following game?1 \2 L C RT 2, 3 3, 4 4, 8M 5, 6 4, 3 7, 1B 6, 2 5, 5 2, 4(A) There is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays both M and B withpositive probability and Player 2 plays both L and C with positive probability(B) The best response of Player 2 to M is C(C) (B,C) is the only Nash equilibrium(D) (M,L) is a Nash equilibrium

Question 1Consider the following two-player game with three actions for each player. How many Nash equilibria are there? (If you are familiar with the concept of mixed strategies, do not count the mixed equilibria.)1 point1234

If the Battle of the Sexes game were played sequentially:a. Only the mixed strategy equilibrium would exist.b. One of the two pure strategy equilibria would become the only equilibrium.c. The two pure strategy equilibria would alternate in being the equilibrium seen ineach round of the game.d. Only the dominant strategy equilibrium would exist.e. The two pure strategy equilibria would exist.