Consider the following abstract two-player game in normal form. Find all pure and mixed-strategy equilibria for this game.HINT: Consider the notion of dominated strategies, in which some strategies are strictly dominated by others, so can be discarded.Show your workingYour Answer:

If a 2 × 2 (2 players with 2 actions each) normal form (matrix) game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria then: (A) Neither player has a dominant strategy. (B) Exactly one player has a dominant strategy. (C) At least one player has a dominant strategy. (D) Both players have dominant strategies. (E) None of the above is necessarily true

A normal form game can only have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if it has at least two Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Question 1 Select one: True False

If the Battle of the Sexes game were played sequentially:a. Only the mixed strategy equilibrium would exist.b. One of the two pure strategy equilibria would become the only equilibrium.c. The two pure strategy equilibria would alternate in being the equilibrium seen ineach round of the game.d. Only the dominant strategy equilibrium would exist.e. The two pure strategy equilibria would exist.

A mixed strategy game can be solved by _

If each player in a game has a strictly dominant strategy, then:Group of answer choicesthe Nash equilibrium is welfare-maximising.each player achieves a maximum payoff in equilibrium.the game has no equilibrium.there cannot be multiple equilibria.the game can only played once.