Self-RelianceRalph Waldo Emerson (adapted excerpt)For nonconformity the world whips you with its displeasure. And therefore a man must know how to estimate a sour face. The bystanders look askance on him in the public street or in the friend's parlor. If this aversation had its origin in contempt and resistance like his own, he might well go home with a sad countenance; but the sour faces of the multitude, like their sweet faces, have no deep cause, but are put on and off as the wind blows and a newspaper directs. Yet is the discontent of the multitude more formidable than that of the senate and the college. It is easy enough for a firm man who knows the world to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. Their rage is decorous and prudent, for they are timid as being very vulnerable themselves. . . A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said today. "Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood." Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.3Select the correct answer.Which statement best describes the repeated use of the word consistency in the passage? A. Emerson repeats the word consistency to highlight the importance of finishing what one has started. B. Emerson repeats the word consistency to emphasize his disapproval of compliant thinking. C. Emerson repeats the word consistency to express his desire for uniformity in transcendentalism. D. Emerson repeats the word consistency to mirror his list of thinkers who were frequently misunderstood.

“Self-Reliance” is an 1841 essay by Ralph Waldo Emerson. In the essay, Emerson promotes the ideas of intuition, independence, and inherent goodness in humans and nature: ____________, Which quotation from “Self-Reliance” most effectively illustrates the claim? Choose 1 answer:“We but half express ourselves, and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents.”eliminate“Trust thyself [… and] accept the place the divine Providence has found for you.”eliminate“Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members.”eliminate“With consistency a great mind has simply nothing to do.”

Which is not a fundamental of self-reliance as described by Paul Godfrey?Group of answer choicesCognitionsMicrocreditBehaviorsAssets

The passage given below is followed by four alternate summaries.Choose the option that best captures the essence of the passage.Aesthetic political representation urges us to realize that ‘the representative has autonomy with regard to the people represented’ but autonomy then is not an excuse to abandon one’s responsibility. Aesthetic autonomy requires the cultivation of ‘disinterestedness’ on the part of actors which is not indifference. To have disinterestedness, that is, to have comportment towards the beautiful that is devoid of all ulterior references to use – requires a kind of aesthetic commitment; it is the liberation of ourselves for the release of what has proper worth only in itself.Please select your Answer.Disinterestedness is different from indifference as the former means a non-subjective evaluation of things which is what constitutes aesthetic political representation.Aesthetic political representation advocates autonomy for the representatives manifested through disinterestedness which itself is different from indifference.Disinterestedness, as distinct from indifference, is the basis of political representation.Aesthetic political representation advocates autonomy for the representatives drawing from disinterestedness, which itself is different from indifference.

to translate Neigung, elsewhere in this version translated as ‘preference’;other translations mostly use ‘inclination’.]Now consider a special case:This person has been a friend to mankind, but hismind has become clouded by a sorrow of his own thathas extinguished all feeling for how others are faring.He still has the power to benefit others in distress, buttheir need leaves him untouched because he is toopreoccupied with his own. But now he tears himselfout of his dead insensibility and acts charitably purelyfrom duty, without feeling any want or liking so tobehave.Now, for the first time, his conduct has genuine moral worth.Having been deprived by nature of a warm-hearted temper-ament, this man could find in himself a source from whichto give himself a far higher worth than he could have gotthrough such a temperament. It is just here that the worth ofcharacter is brought out, which is morally the incomparablyhighest of all: he is beneficent not from preference but fromduty.To secure one’s own happiness is a duty (at least indi-rectly), because discontent with one’s condition—bundledalong by many cares and unmet needs—could easily becomea great temptation to transgress against duties. But quiteapart from duty, all men have the strongest and deepest de-sire [Neigung] for happiness, because in the idea of happinessall our desires are brought together in a single sum-total.But the injunction ‘Be happy!’ often takes a form in which itthwarts some desires, so that a person can’t get a clear andsecure concept of •the sum-total of satisfactions that goesunder the name ‘happiness’. So it isn’t surprising that theprospect of •a single satisfaction, definite as to what it is andwhen it can be had, can outweigh a fluctuating idea ·suchas that of happiness·. For example, a man with the gout[a painful ailment made worse by alcohol and rich food] can chooseto enjoy what he likes and put up with the consequences,because according to his calculations (this time, anyway) hehasn’t sacrificed present pleasure to a possibly groundlessexpectation of the ‘happiness’ that health is supposed tobring. But even for this man, whose will is not settled by thegeneral desire for happiness and for whom health plays nopart in his calculations, there still remains—as there doesfor everyone—the law that he ought to promote his happiness,not from wanting or liking but from duty. Only by followingthis could his conduct have true moral worth.No doubt this is how we should understand the scripturalpassages that command us to love our neighbour and evenour enemy. We can’t be commanded to feel love for someone,or to simply prefer that he thrive. There are two sorts oflove: •practical love that lies in the will and in principlesof action, and •pathological love that lies in the directionthe person’s feelings and tender sympathies take. [Kant uses‘pathological’ simply to mean that this is a state that the person is in;from Greek pathos = ‘that which happens to a person’; no suggestion ofabnormality. His point is that being a loving person is no more morallysignificant than being a stupid person or a right-handed person.] Thelatter of these cannot be commanded, but the former canbe—and that is a command to do good to others from duty,even when you don’t want to do it or like doing it, and indeedeven when you naturally and unconquerably hate doing it.·So much for the first proposition of morality:•For an action to have genuine moral worth it must bedone from duty.·The second proposition is:•An action that is done from duty doesn’t get its moralvalue from the purpose that’s to be achieved throughit but from the maxim that it involves, ·giving thereason why the person acts thus·.9

_____ is the tendency to perceive others who are like ourselves more positively than we perceive people who are different.