Wozza, an entrepreneur, can either Enter (E) or Hold (H). Shazza, a rival entrepreneur, observes Wozza’s choice, then can choose to either play E or H. The payoffs are as follows: Following (E, E) (played by Wozza, then Shazza) the payoffs are (20, 50) to Wozza and Shazza, respectively. Following (E, H) the payoffs are (30, 80). Following (H, E) the payoffs are (60, 20). Finally, following (H, H), the payoffs are (20, 15) to Wozza and Shazza. Which statement is FALSE?Group of answer choicesH (played by Shazza) following E is credibleThe observed outcome in the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium is H then E.If the order that the players get to choose E and H is reversed, the observed outcome (and actions) of the entrepreneurs will be different.H (played by Shazza) following H is credible.The sum of the payoffs to the entrepreneurs in the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium is 80.

Consider the following sequential game. Wally first chooses L or H. Having observed Wally’s choice, Elizabeth chooses between A and F. The payoffs are as follows. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth chose A, the payoffs are 20 to Wally and 30 to Elizabeth. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 25 to Wally and 40 and to Elizabeth. If Wally decides to opt for H and Elizabeth A, the payoffs are 30 and 20 to Wally and Elizabeth, respectively. Finally, if Wally opts for H and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 20 to Wally and 50 to Elizabeth. What is the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game?Group of answer choices(H,A)(L,F)(H,F)(L,A)(L,F) and (H,A)

Consider the following sequential game. Wally first chooses L or H. Having observed Wally’s choice, Elizabeth chooses between A and F. The payoffs are as follows. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth chose A, the payoffs are 30 to Wally and 20 to Elizabeth. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 40 to Wally and 10 and to Elizabeth. If Wally decides to opt for H and Elizabeth A, the payoffs are 10 and 2 to Wally and Elizabeth, respectively. Finally, if Wally opts for H and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 35 toWally and 5 to Elizabeth. What is the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game?Group of answer choices(L,F)(H,A)(H,F) and (L,F)(L,A) and (H,F)(H,F)

Consider the following sequential game. Wally first chooses L or H. Having observed Wally’s choice, Elizabeth chooses between A and F. The payoffs are as follows. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth chose A, the payoffs are 30 to Wally and 20 to Elizabeth. If Wally chose L and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 40 to Wally and 10 and to Elizabeth. If Wally decides to opt for H and Elizabeth A, the payoffs are 10 and 2 to Wally and Elizabeth, respectively. Finally, if Wally opts for H and Elizabeth F, the payoffs are 35 toWally and 5 to Elizabeth. What is the outcome in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game? Group of answer choices (L,F) (H,A) (H,F) and (L,F) (L,A) and (H,F) (H,F)

Consider this following sequential game played by two investors. Cat chooses either to go long (L) of short (S). Cat’s choice is observed by rival Cutter. Cutter then can choose to either play Hard (H) or Diverse (D). The payoffs are as follows. Following (L, H) the payoffs are (300, 500) to Cat and Cutter, respectively. If the actions are L then D, the payoffs are (0, 0). If the actions are S and then H, the payoffs are (0, 0). Finally, if the actions are (S, D) the payoffs are (300, 500). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium we observe:Group of answer choicesS then DL then HS then HS then LS then D, or L then H.

Consider a market in which Aldi must choose whether to Enter (E) or Not Enter (NE). If Aldi chooses to Not Enter, its payoff is 10 and its rival Coles’ payoff is 20. If Aldi Enters this is observed by Coles, and Coles must choose either to Punish (P) or Accommodate (A). If following Entry by Aldi Coles Punishes the payoffs are 5 to Aldi and 10 to Coles. If following Entry by Aldi Coles Accommodates the payoffs are 12 to Aldi and 15 to Coles. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices(NE, A)(E, P)(NE, P) and (E, A)(NE, P)(E, A)