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There are 2 players and each chooses a number in {1,2,3,4}. Player 1 wins and Player 2 loses if the difference of the numbers chosen, computed as the larger number chosen minus the smaller number chosen, is even and strictly greater than zero. Player 1 loses and Player 2 wins if that difference is odd and strictly greater than zero. If neither player wins, there is a draw.If and  describe the payoffs of players 1 and 2, respectively, that materialize if player 1 chooses  and player 2 chooses , then which of the following statements is true? We can model the described situation by a game in which and and . We can model the described situation by a game in which and and . None of the other alternatives is true. We can model the described situation by a game in which and .

Question

There are 2 players and each chooses a number in {1,2,3,4}. Player 1 wins and Player 2 loses if the difference of the numbers chosen, computed as the larger number chosen minus the smaller number chosen, is even and strictly greater than zero. Player 1 loses and Player 2 wins if that difference is odd and strictly greater than zero. If neither player wins, there is a draw.If and  describe the payoffs of players 1 and 2, respectively, that materialize if player 1 chooses  and player 2 chooses , then which of the following statements is true? We can model the described situation by a game in which and and . We can model the described situation by a game in which and and . None of the other alternatives is true. We can model the described situation by a game in which and .

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