Two restaurant proprietors, James and May, must simultaneously decide on the locations of their restaurants. The choices are on Pitt Street (P) or King Street (K). If both opt for P, the payoffs are (10, 20) to James and May, respectively. If both proprietors opt for K the payoffs are (10, 8). If James choose P and May chooses K, the payoffs are (5, 4). Finally, if James chooses K and May chooses P, the payoffs are (7, 3). The Nash equilibrium/equilibria is/are (P, P) and (K, K) . This is a [ Select ] game

Consider two restaurants, R1 and R2, simultaneously decide what sort of cuisine they will focus on, Thai (T) or Vietnamese (V). If both opt for T, the payoffs are 10 each. If both opt for V, the payoffs are 20 each. If R1 plays T and R2 V the payoffs are (30, 40). If R1 plays V and R2 T, the payoffs are (50, 60) for R1 and R2, respectively. What are the Nash equilibria?Group of answer choices(V, V)(T, T)(T, T) and (V, V); this is a coordination game(T, V) and (V, T); this is a coordination game.None of the above.

Two restaurants, Fried Bird and Tofu Delights, are simultaneously choosing their locations. Either firm can either choose to locate in the City or in the Suburbs. The payoffs are as follows. If one firm choose City and the other Suburbs, each firm gets 0. If both firms go to the City, Fried Bird gets 5 and Tofu Delights 10. If both opt for the Suburbs, Fried Bird gets 15 and Tofu Delights 2. What are the Nash equilibria?Group of answer choices(Suburbs, Suburbs)(City, City) and (Suburbs, Suburbs)(City, Suburbs) and (Suburbs, City)(City, City)(Suburbs, City)

Consider a location game with two ice cream vendors, where there are five possible locations: 0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, and 1. There are many customers, and they are uniformly distributed along the street between 0 and 1. Each customer goes to the nearest vendor. If vendors are located at the same place, they split their customers equally. A vendor’s payoff is the number of customers she/he gets. Vendors simultaneously choose their locations.QuestionWhat is the Nash equilibrium of this game?Hint: If you are unsure about this question, review lecture 1-9.1 pointVendors are located on 0 and 1. None of the above. Both choose 1/2. Vendors are located on 1/4 and 3/4.

Consider the following game. Player A and B simultaneously choose to work on either Project 1 (P1) or Project 2 (P2). The payoffs are as follows: if both players choose P1 the payoffs are 6 to A and 2 to B; if A chooses P1 and B chooses P2 the payoffs are 0 to each party; likewise, if A chooses P2 and B chooses P1 the payoffs are 0 to each party; and, finally, if A chooses P2 and B P2 the payoffs are 3 to both players. What are all of the Nash equilibria of this game? a. (P1, P1) b. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) c. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 1/3, Player B plays P1 with probability 1/2) d. (P1, P1), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 3/5, Player B plays P1 with probability 1/3) e. (P1, P2), (P2, P2) and (Player A plays P1 with probability 1/2, Player B plays P1 with probability 2/3)

Consider the following game in which Sally can play T or B and John chooses between L or R. Each player makes their choice simultaneously. If Sally chooses T and John chooses L, Sally gets a payoff of 3 and John has a payoff of 7. If Sally plays T and John R, Sally’s payoff is 5 and John gets 1. If Sally Chooses B and John L, the payoffs are 1 to Sally and 2 to John. Finally, if Sally chooses B and John R, the payoffs are 4 to Sally and 3 to John. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices(T,L) and (B,R)(T,L)(B,R)None of the other answers are correct.(T, R)