Consider the following Stag hunt game. What is the risk dominant equilibrium? L RU 9,9 0,5D 5,0 5,5Group of answer choices(U,L)(U,R)(D,L)(D,R)

Consider the following game. What is the payoff dominant equilibrium? L RU 5,5 0,0D 0,0 1,1Group of answer choices(U,L)(D,L)(U,R)(U,R)

Consider the following game.   L M2 RU 0,4 2,3 1,1M1 3.2 2,3 3,2D 9,2 1,1 2,2Which option has all Nash equilibria and nothing else?Group of answer choices(D,L) and (M1, M2)(M1,R)(M1,R) and (M1, L)(D,R), (D,L), and (M1, M2)(M1,M2)(U,R)

Which is true for the following game?1 \2 L C RT 3, 5 4, 6 5, 9M 6, 4 4, 6 8, 4B 4, 6 6, 4 3, 5(A) (T,R) is a Nash equilibrium(B) There is a Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays M and B with equal probability andPlayer 2 plays each action L, C and R with positive probability(C) There is a Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays each action T, M and B with positiveprobability and Player 2 plays each action L, C and R with positive probability(D) There is a Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays M and B with equal probability andPlayer 2 plays L and C with equal probability

Consider the two player game described by the payoff matrix below.  L RU -1,5 2,1D -1,1 1,0How many outcomes survive the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies? Write your answer as an integer (e.g. 5). [Note that a strategy profile is an outcome, for example (D,R) is an outcome.]

Which is true for the following game?1 \2 L C RT 2, 3 3, 4 4, 8M 5, 6 4, 3 7, 1B 6, 2 5, 5 2, 4(A) There is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays both M and B withpositive probability and Player 2 plays both L and C with positive probability(B) The best response of Player 2 to M is C(C) (B,C) is the only Nash equilibrium(D) (M,L) is a Nash equilibrium