Consider the following entry game played between rivals Huawei and Apple. Firstly, Huawei can consider entering a new market (E) or not entering (NE). If Huawei opts for NE, the payoffs to Huawei and Apple are (10, 100), respectively. If Huawei enters, Apple observes this choice by its rival and can itself choose NE or E. This choice by Apple is observed by Huawei, who can then make a choice whether to Retreat (R) or Stay (S). If Huawei entered (E) the market, and Apple chose to NE, if Huawei opted to R, the payoffs are (10, 50). If Huawei opted for E, Apple chose NE and Huawei then Stayed (S) the payoffs are (80, 20). If Huawei chose E, then Apple chose E, and then Huawei chose R, the payoffs are (5, 95). Finally, if Huawei opted for E, Apple E, then Huawei chose S, the payoffs are (0, 40). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium outcome of the game, the payoff enjoyed by Apple isGroup of answer choices10050209540

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). The timing of the game is that Apple gets to choose whether to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE). Then, observing its rival’s choice, Samsung gets to choose whether to E or to NE. If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung also Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung chooses NE; there is a first-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung also chooses to Not Enter; there is a first-mover advantageNone of the above

Consider the phone handset market. Assume there are just two firms making phones – Apple and Samsung. The timing of the game is as follows. Apple first chooses whether to Launch a new phone or Wait. Observing this, Samsung then decides itself whether to Launch or Wait. The payoffs of the game are as follows. If Apple Launches, then Samsung also Launches, the returns are 12 each. If both firms Wait, the payoffs are 15 each. If Apple launches, then Samsung Waits the payoff is 30 to Apple and 20 to Samsung. If Apples Waits and Samsung then Launches the payoffs are 20 and 30 to Apple and Samsung, respectively. What is the outcome in the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium?Group of answer choicesApple Waits, Samsung LaunchesBoth firms LaunchApple Wait, Samsung WaitsApple Launches, Samsung WaitsNone of the other answers are correct.

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). Each firm simultaneously makes its choice whether or not to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE).  If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. What are the Nash equilibria of the game?Group of answer choices. (NE, E) and (E, NE), where the first strategy in each parentheses is Apple’s and the second is Samsung’s(E, E)(E, NE)(E, E) and (NE, NE)(NE, E)

Consider this following sequential game played by two investors. Cat chooses either to go long (L) of short (S). Cat’s choice is observed by rival Cutter. Cutter then can choose to either play Hard (H) or Diverse (D). The payoffs are as follows. Following (L, H) the payoffs are (300, 500) to Cat and Cutter, respectively. If the actions are L then D, the payoffs are (0, 0). If the actions are S and then H, the payoffs are (0, 0). Finally, if the actions are (S, D) the payoffs are (300, 500). In the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium we observe:Group of answer choicesS then DL then HS then HS then LS then D, or L then H.

Consider a game in which Myer and DJs simultaneously choose whether to advertise (ADV) or not advertise (NOT). If both firms opt to ADV, the payoffs are 10 to Myer and 7 to DJs. If both firms choose NOT, the payoffs are (5,8) where the first payoff is Myer’s and the second DJs’. If Myer plays NOT and DJs ADV, the payoffs are (20, 6). Finally, if Myer plays ADV and DJs Not, the payoffs are (15, 12), respectively. Which statement is (most) true?Group of answer choicesDJs has a dominant strategy.Myer does not have a dominant strategy.Myer’s best response to a strategy of ADV by DJs is to play NOT.The Nash equilibrium is (ADV, NOT), for Myer and DJs respectively.All of the above statements are true.