Drumpf Country Club has the only golf course in Distopia. The (annual)demand to play a round of golf on its course is given byD (p) = 12000  10pwhere D (p) is the number of rounds demanded each year if Drumpf chargeda uniform price of p per round. The marginal cost of having someone playa round of golf is zero and the annual (fixed) cost of maintaining the golfcourse is 1000000.(a) (15 points) Determine the optimal uniform price for Drumpf tocharge for a round of golf. Compare the welfare of golfers and Drumpfin this situation compared to what would have been the case if the pricehad been set equal to the marginal cost (and the fixed cost had beencovered by a subsidy from the Distopian Government). What is thedeadweight loss that arises from Drumpf employing monopoly uniformpricing instead of having marginal-cost pricing. (NOTE: you shouldtreat the quantity D (p) as a continuous variable. This meansyou should evaluate welfare measures such as consumer andproducer surpluses as areas below continuous curves.)Drumpf undertakes some market research and finds that its market demandcomes from the aggregation of the demands of 100 golfers who each have an1identical demand for rounds of golf given byxh (p) = 120  p10where xh (p) is the number of rounds of golf demanded by golfer h, h =1, . . . , 100.(b) (10 points) Imagine you have been hired by Drumpf as a consultantto help it maximize profit. In light of the information above, explainhow by not charging golfers for each individual round of golf they playbut rather charging them a golf club membership fee that allows themember to play an unlimited number of rounds of golf can increaseDrumpf’s profit. Calculate the optimal membership fee to charge andcarefully explain what impact this would have on the number of roundsof golf demanded and Drumpf’s profit.For the rest of this question assume that instead of all golfers being identical,there are two types of golfers, “tragics” and “dilettantes”. There are fifty ofeach type and the demand of a tragic is given byxT (p) = 160  p10 ,while that of a dilettante is given byxD (p) = 80  p10 .Unfortunately for Drumpf, it is not possible to tell beforehand whether agolfer is of either type.(c) (5 points) Explain to Drumpf, what is the most it can set for its(fixed) membership fee if it wishes to attract both types of golfers.(d) (10 points) Explain to Drumpf how it can still have the same aggre-gate demand for rounds of golf but get more from the tragics if it o§ersdi§erent classes of memberships that entitles a golfer to play di§erentamounts of rounds of golf for the di§erent classes. [Hint: consider astandard membership that allows a golfer to play 80 rounds of golf,and a gold membership that at a higher price entitles the golfer toplay as many rounds as they wish. What is the most that a dilettanteis willing to pay for a standard (quantity limited) membership? Andgiven the fee for standard membership, what is the most that a tragicwould be willing to pay to be allowed to play an unlimited number ofrounds of golf?]2(e) (10 points) Without doing any explicit calculations, explain the in-tuition behind how Drumpf could increase its profit even more if thestandard membership only entitled the member to play fewer than 80rounds of golf