Mazda and Toyota are considering developing new technology for electric cars. The timing of the game is as follows. Mazda chooses whether to develop Technology 1 (T1) or technology 2 (T2). This choice of Mazda is observed by Toyota. Then Toyota chooses whether to invest in T1 or T2. The profits to the first are: if both invest in T1 the payoffs are (5, 10) for Mazda and Toyota respectively; if both firms invest in T2 the payoffs are (5, 10); if one firm invests in T1 and the other T2, the payoffs are (10, 5) for Mazda and Toyota. In the credible equilibria, what do we observe as the outcome of the game, and is there a first- or second-mover advantage?Group of answer choicesMazda invests in T1 and Toyota invests in T2; there is a first-mover advantageMazda invests in T1 and Toyota invests in T2; there is a second-mover advantageMazda invests in T1 and Toyota invests in T1; there is a first-mover advantageMazda invests in T2 and Toyota invests in T1; there is a first-mover advantageWe observe that Toyota always invests in the same technology as Mazda (be it T1 or T2); there is a second-mover advantage

Consider Apple and Samsung considering developing an entering a new market (by developing a new type of device). The timing of the game is that Apple gets to choose whether to Enter (E) or to Not Enter (NE). Then, observing its rival’s choice, Samsung gets to choose whether to E or to NE. If both firms enter (E) the payoff is -5 to each firm. If both firms do not enter (NE) they each get a profit of 2. If one enters and the other chooses to NE, the entrant gets 10 and the other firm gets a profit of 0. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung also Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple Enters, then Samsung chooses NE; there is a first-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung Enters; there is a second-mover advantageIn the outcome of the credible equilibrium Apple chooses to NE, then Samsung also chooses to Not Enter; there is a first-mover advantageNone of the above

Consider the technology choices for a new phone handset for the iPhone and Galaxy by their respective head companies. Both firms can simultaneously choose either technology 1 (T1) or technology 2 (T2). The payoffs from a choice of (T1, T1) is 20 for each firm (note that the first term relates to Galaxy and the second iPhone). If both firms go for T2, the payoffs are 30 for each firm. If the strategies adopted are (T2, T1), the payoffs are (50, 80). Finally, if the strategies adopted are (T1, T2) the payoffs are (60, 70) for Galaxy and iPhone respectively. Which statement is true?Group of answer choicesThe Nash equilibrium is (T1, T1)The Nash equilibrium is (T2, T2)The Nash equilibrium is (T1, T2)The Nash equilibria are (T1, T1) and (T2, T2); this is an example of firms adopting a minimal product differentiation strategy.The Nash equilibria are (T2, T1) and (T1, T2); this is an example of firms adopting a maximal differentiation strategy.

Answer the next question based on the following payoff matrix for two oligopolistic firms in which the numbers indicate the profit in millions of dollars for each firm.   Firm AHigh Price Low PriceFirm B High Price A = $250B = $250A = $325B = $200Low Price A = $200B = $325A = $175B = $175 If Firm A adopts the low-price strategy, then Firm B would adopt theMultiple Choicehigh-price strategy and earn $250.high-price strategy and earn $200.low-price strategy and earn $325.low-price strategy and earn $175.

BP and ExxonMobil are engaged in negotiations regarding a new exploration. Simultaneously BP can choose to play Tough (T) or soft (S), while ExxonMobil can opt for Intransigent (I) or Acquiesce (A). The payoffs are as follows. If the choices are T and I, the payoffs are 3 to each firm. If the choices are S and I the payoffs are (1, 4) for BP and ExxonMobil, respectively. If the actions of the firms are T and A, the payoffs are (4, 1), and if the actions are S and A, then the payoffs are (5, 5). Which of the following is a Nash equilibrium? (CHOOSE ALL CORRECT ANSWER)Group of answer choices(S, I)(T, I)(T, A)(S, A)

Consider two mutually exclusive projects E and S. Both projects have the same profitability index of 1.2 (PIE = PIS = 1.2). The initial investment of Project E is I0,E = -$367,000, and the initial investment of Project S is I0,S = -$265,000. Which of the following statements is true?Question 7AnswerWe are unable to make an investment decision based on the information provided.cross outThe payback period of project E is 1.2 years.cross outThe NPV of project S is greater than the NPV of project E.cross outThe NPV of project E is greater than the NPV of project S.cross outThe NPVs of project E and S are equal.