(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.)What is true according to the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (IESDS) in the following game? L R T -5,-3 -2,-5 B -3,-4 -6,-1 None of the other alternatives is true. The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (T,R). The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (T,L). The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (B,R). The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (B,L).
Question
(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.)What is true according to the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (IESDS) in the following game? L R T -5,-3 -2,-5 B -3,-4 -6,-1 None of the other alternatives is true. The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (T,R). The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (T,L). The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (B,R). The unique strategy profile that survives IESDS is (B,L).
Solution
To solve this, we need to look at each player's strategies and eliminate any strongly dominated strategies.
A strategy is strongly dominated if there is another strategy that always gives a better payoff, regardless of what the other player does.
For Player 1:
- If Player 2 plays L, Player 1 gets -5 for T and -3 for B. So, B dominates T.
- If Player 2 plays R, Player 1 gets -2 for T and -6 for B. So, T dominates B.
There is no strategy that is always better for Player 1, so we cannot eliminate any of Player 1's strategies by IESDS.
For Player 2:
- If Player 1 plays T, Player 2 gets -3 for L and -5 for R. So, L dominates R.
- If Player 1 plays B, Player 2 gets -4 for L and -1 for R. So, R dominates L.
There is no strategy that is always better for Player 2, so we cannot eliminate any of Player 2's strategies by IESDS.
Therefore, none of the strategies can be eliminated by IESDS, and all strategy profiles (T,L), (T,R), (B,L), and (B,R) survive IESDS.
So, the correct answer is "None of the other alternatives is true."
Similar Questions
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